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TRADEMARKS-Successful Plaintiffs in Trademark
Infringement Actions Under the Lanham Act
May Not Recover Attorney's Fees-Maier
Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann
Distilling Corp.*

In an action for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act1
and for unfair competition, the District Court enjoined the defendant company from further use of the trademark2 and awarded the
plaintiff $60,000 in attorney's fees. 3 On appeal, held, reversed in
part. The issuance of the injunction was upheld but the court declared that attorney's fees are not recoverable in trademark infringement cases prosecuted under the Lanham Act since Congress had
not expressly provided for such awards. 4
The decision in the principal case accords with the well-established general rule in the United States that, absent a contrary statute
• 359 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1966) (en bane), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3111 (U.S.
Oct. 11, 1966) (No. 1396, 1965 Term; renumbered No. 214, 1966 Term) [Hereinafter
cited as principal case].
1. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964).
2. The plaintiff Fleischmann Distilling Corporation is the sole American distributor of "Black. and White" Scotch whiskey. The trademark is owned and registered by
James Buchanan &: Co., Ltd., also a party to the action. Defendant Maier Brewing
Company brewed and distributed in the Los Angeles area a "Black and White" beer
which was held to infringe the registered trademark.
3. No damages were proved in the trial court. An accounting for defendant's profits
is pending this interlocutory appeal on the question of attorney's fees, certified to
involve a controlling question of law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
4. This is the second appeal in this somewhat protracted litigation. The first
appeal, dealing with the question of whether there was an infringement, was expressly
grounded on the Lanham Act rather than the state unfair competition cause of action.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 161 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
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or contract, attorney's fees are not recoverable in an ordinary action
at law or in equity by either a successful plaintiff or a successful defendant. 5 It has been suggested that an explanation for the American
departure from the "English Rule" under which attorney's fees are
generally awarded6 may be found in history. During the formative
stages of our country's development, relatively few litigants engaged
attorneys to represent them in court so that the question of attorney's
fees was not commonly encountered; when the question was presented, the courts, seeking to promote free access to the judicial
processes, felt constrained not to award attorney's fees since they
believed that such an award to a successful litigant might discourage
a potential litigant from bringing a somewhat dubious suit.7 Contemporary arguments have reinforced these historical bases of judicial reluctance to award attorney's fees to the successful litigant. 8
Attorney's fees, it is argued, cannot properly be classified as damages
because they are too remote from the wrong done, are not reasonably foreseeable as flowing from the act of the defendant, and accrue
only after the cause of action is complete. Furthermore, there is the
fear that attorney's fees would tend to become exorbitant if they
could be charged to the losing party and that there would be administrative difficulty in determining what amount is "reasonable."
Finally, it is argued that a party should be compensated only for
harm suffered as a result of "wrongful conduct" and that to institute
or defend a suit in a court of law should not be considered ·wrongful
unless it is totally unfounded and malicious.
Those who press for the adoption of the English Rule in this
country9 attempt to answer the above arguments as follows: (I) today's court congestion and crowded calendars dispell the notion that
there is a need to encourage litigation; 10 (2) litigants acting pro se
5. Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872); Arcambel v. Wiseman, !I U.S.
(!I Dall.) 306 (1796). See generally McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 60-71 (1935); Annot., 8
L. Ed. 2d 894, 898 (196!1).
6. The English Rule has generally provided for the award of attorneys' fees to
the successful litigant as a matter of course in actions at law since the time of the
Statute of Gloucester, 1275, 6 Edw. 1, c. I. In suits in equity, such awards were tradi•
tionally made at the court's discretion. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 854
(1929).
7. See Goodhart, supra note 6, at 876.
8. See Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872); McCORMICK, DAMAGES
§ 71 (1935); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element
of Damages, 15 MINN. L. R.Ev. 619 (1931).
9. Professor McCormick has long favored inclusion of attorney's fees as a part of
taxable costs. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an
Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. R.Ev. 619, 643 (1931). More recent commentators
urging that the English Rule be adopted in the United States include: Kuenzel, The
Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REv. 75 (1963); Stoebuck,
Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 CoLO. L. R.Ev. 202 (1966).
See also McCOR!IUCK, DAMAGES § 71 (1935).
IO. Kuenzel, supra note 9, at 76.
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today are the exception rather than the rule, and attorneys may, in
fact, be deemed essential to most litigation; (3) attorney's fees may
not be "direct" results of the wrong, but they are certainly consequential and should be foreseeable; (4) judges and Masters today
determine "reasonable" amounts in many other contexts and the
English system of Taxing Masters has been satisfactorily administered for many years; 11 (5) as a matter of policy, the successful party
is entitled to be fully compensated for injuries sustained and expenses incurred, since these expenses were necessitated by the opposing party. It is perhaps this last argument, which in effect urges
the natural extension of the theory of compensation which underlies
the awarding of damages, that is the most compelling.
As the result of a balancing of the conflicting considerations mentioned above, a number of exceptions to the general rule denying
attorney's fees have been made in the United States. Putting to one
side the "fractional recovery" 12 of attorney's fees as part of the
normally ta.~ed costs, several federal statutes do expressly provide
for reasonable attorney's fees. 13 Analytically, each of these statutes
rests on one of the three justifications for departing from the general
rule in cases involving a successful plaintiff. The three justifications
are: (1) to encourage policing and enforcement of the act by the
general citizenry (Securities and Antitrust legislation); (2) to give
some compensation for vindicating a just claim (Tort Claims Act);
(3) to effect an additional measure of deterrent (Patent and Copyright Acts). Judicial decisions have extended the limited boundaries
of this legislative fabric so as to allow attorney's fees in situations
where they are not provided for by statute. These decisions, which
award not only costs "between party and party" but also costs "as
between solicitor and client," rely primarily upon the "historic
11. Under the English system, solicitors' fees are fixed by statute, but barristers'
fees are generally related to the difficulty of the case and the amount in controversy.
If the losing party does not agree to the amounts with which he is charged, he may
petition for submission of the matter to the Taxing Master, who has great discretion
in allowing or disallowing items of costs. See, Goodhart, supra note 6, at 855.
12. That is, the traditional allowance of an item denominated "counsel fees" as
part of the ordinary taxable costs, which bears no relation at all to the actual amount
expended for counsel. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. R.Ev. § 52-257 (Supp. 1965), allowing
$25.00 counsel fees. Sec also Federal Taxable Cost Bill, 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1964).
13. E.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1964); Interstate Commerce
Act, 34 Stat. 590 (1960), 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1964); Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 908
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 889, 897
(1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1964); Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1964); Trust Indenture Act, 53 Stat. 1176 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1964); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1964); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1964). There are also
numerous state statutes which provide for attorney's fees in a variety of cases. E.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2425 (Supp. 1961) (abate public nuisances); MINN. STAT.
§ 518.14 (1957) (recovery by either spouse in a divorce action); ILL. R.Ev. STAT. § 16
(1963) (opposing trademark registration).
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equity jurisdiction" of the courts, stemming from the traditional
discretion of the chancellor to do justice between the parties according to the circumstances.14
In the area of trademark infringement and unfair competition,
recognition by the federal courts of their equity power has led to
the development of a rather substantial body of case law holding
that attornefs fees are recoverable by a successful plaintiff, notwithstanding the absence of express statutory authority in the Lanham
Act. 15 It is this line of authority which the principal case repudiates.16 An early leading decision holding that attorney's fees may be
recovered by a plaintiff in a trademark case is Aladdin Mfg. Co.
v. Mantle Lamp Co.,17 decided under the Trademark Act of 1905.18
In that case, the Second Circuit relied on the district court's finding
that the infringer was "willful and fraudulent," on its own general
equity power, and on the "governing principles of compensatory
damages." The Aladdin court neither cited authority for nor discussed the reasoning behind its holding; the only clue to its ratio
decidendi is the denomination of the defendant as "a deliberate
tortfeasor," which suggests that the recovery of costs was in the
nature of a penalty against the defendant rather than compensation
for the plaintiff. Later cases under the Lanham Act, reaching the
same result, 19 have applied a plethora of "tests" in evaluating the
14. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'! Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
15. Unless an indication is made to the contrary, the discussion in the text relates
only to awards of attorney's fees to plaintiffs in Lanham Act suits. See note 48 infra.
16. The court expressly overruled one prior Ninth Circuit case which had allowed
counsel fees under the Lanham Act, Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867 (9th
Cir. 1959), and limited another Ninth Circuit case to "its actual holding," National
Van Lines v. Dean, 237 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1956). It is perhaps noteworthy that the
arguments before the court did not challenge the validity of these prior cases, but
rather urged that "exceptional" circumstances did not exist. Thus the research, exam•
inations, and arguments ,in the opinion are the court's own. Appellant's Opening
Brief, p. 14, Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 359 F.2d 156 (9th
Cir. 1966). Although National Van Lines is grounded on both a state claim of unfair
competition and federal trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, the court
did not differentiate between the two grounds as support for the award of attorney's
fees.
The court in the principal case also specifically disapproves of several leading
cases in other circuits which had approved the award: Baker v. Simmons Co., 325 F.2d
580 (1st Cir. 1963); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538 (2nd
Cir. 1956); Keller Prods., Inc. v. Rubber Linings Corp., 213 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1954);
Admiral Corp. v. Penco, 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp
Co., 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941).
'
17. 116 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1941).
18. 38 Stat. 724 (1905).
19. There is some confusion as to whether the allowance of attorney's fees is to be
characterized as compensatory damages or as additions to the taxable costs. Some
courts have clearly deemed the recovery compensatory. E.g., Keller Prods., Inc. v.
Rubber Linings Corp., 213 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1954). Others have treated it as part
of costs. E.g., A. Smith Bowman Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 204 F. Supp.
374 (D. Del. 1962). Most cases do not distinguish between the two. E.g., Maternally
Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234- F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956). While the effect of
the denomination is not clear, it appears that actual recovery is more often denied
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conduct of the defendant, such as "unconscionable," 20 "fraudulent,"21
"willful,"22 "in bad faith,'' 23 "vexatious,'' 24 "malicious," 25 or "deliberate."26 All of these cases have several other factors in common.
First, all were apparently pleaded and tried on two causes of action:
Lanham Act trademark infringement and state unfair competition.27
Second, the courts did not explicitly tie the awards of attorney's
fees to either of these causes of action.28 Third, none of the courts
when the court speaks in terms of the "costs" theory, although this theory also recognizes the power to award attorney's fees. See A. Smith Bowman Distillery, Inc. v.
Schenley Distillers, Inc., supra; Apple Growers Ass'n v. Pelletti Fruit Co., 153 F. Supp.
948 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Williamson Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 149 F. Supp 852
(E.D. Pa. 1957). This suggests that the courts are more willing to depart from the
general rule where they can tie the departure to compensation for harm done to
the plaintiff, rather than the somewhat more vague "justice in the circumstances."
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962),
a suit in admiralty brought by a seaman for maintenance and cure, distinguished
between allowance of counsel fees taxed as costs as part of the court's equitable powers
and as compensatory damages. In that case, the Court awarded fees as compensatory
damages, stating that the plaintiff was "forced to hire a lawyer and to go to court to get
what was plainly owed him" by a "callous" and "willfully persistent" and recalcitrant
employer. Id. at 530-31. Although thus distinguishing the two theories mentioned
above, it appears that the Court blurs the distinction in applying what appear to be
equitable considerations rather than stressing the compensatory element.
20. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Singer Upholstering &: Sewing Co., 130 F. Supp. 205, 208
(W.D. Pa. 1955).
21. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956).
22. National Van Lines v. Dean, 237 F.2d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 1956).
23. Williamson Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 149 F. Supp. 852, 855 (E.D.
Pa, 1957).
24. Ibid.
25. A. Smith Bowman Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 374,
380 (D. Del. 1962).
26. Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1959).
27. With the exception of Wolfe v. National Lead Co., supra note 26, which was
overruled by the principal case.
28. Cf. note 4 supra. It has been argued that the Lanham Act comprehends a
federal cause of action in unfair competition as well as trademark infringement. See
l CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 78 n.41.l (2d ed. 1950, Supp. 1965).
But see Note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1095, 1101-05 (1953). This argument has not, it seems,
been adopted by the majority of federal courts. See l CALLMAN, op. cit. supra at 78
n.41.1. The Ninth Circuit, however, is perhaps the leading advocate of the view that
a cause of action for unfair competition is created where there is present the requisite
effect on interstate commerce. Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950). This view
was not a factor in the principal case since unfair competition was pleaded as a
state cause of action, with pendant jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964).
However, it is established that state law proscribing unfair competition cannot be
utilized to defeat or expand the provisions of the federal patent or copyright laws.
Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting
Co., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Assuming, arguendo, that federal trademark law did preclude
attorney's fees, it is submitted that the Sears/ Compco doctrine would not be permitted
to limit state regulation of unfair competition in this regard. The Court in those cases
seemed to emphasize the public interest in permitting the monopolistic patents and
copyrights to endure for a specified and limited time only and rested its holding on
the supremacy clause and the express and exclusively federal provision of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In the trademark situation the public interest in limiting
"legalized monopolies" is absent since trademarks protect the goodwill built up in a
name or symbol and do not operate to restrict the type of products marketed. See 3
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discussed the language of the remedy provisions of the Lanham
Act29 or related these provisions to their decisions. Finally, all of
the courts apparently rested their decisions on their "inherent equity
power" or cited, without comment, earlier decisions which, as noted
above, similarly had not enunciated their rationale.
As a result of its departure from this precedent, the court in the
principal case apparently stands alone in concluding that the Lanham Act's failure to provide expressly for attorney's fees precludes
courts from granting such awards in trademark cases.30 In arriving
at its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit, speaking through Judge Duniway, did not summarily dismiss the contrary authority, but rather
meticulously examined the cases which had considered the question
and found them to be without merit.31 Nevertheless, it is submitted
that a consideration of the aforementioned "historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts," in conjunction with the language and
"spirit" of the remedies section of the Lanham Act, 32 should have
resulted in a contrary decision on the question of law. That is, the
Lanham Act does not preclude the courts, as a matter of law, from
awarding attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff in a trademark infringement action.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that
"in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice" the
federal courts may exercise their "historic equity jurisdiction" in
CALLMAN, op. cit. supra, at 974-86. Also federal supremacy invoked here would rest on
the less thunderous grounds of trademark jurisdiction pursuant to the interstate commerce power. Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
29. 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1964).
30. Accord, Gold Dust Corp. v. Hoffenberg, 87 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1937). This was
also an unfair competition and trademark infringement case, but arose under the
Trademark Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 724. The District Court allowed the recovery of
attorney's fees to the defendant, reasoning that the plaintiff had not sustained his
"gross and willful" allegations and had not promptly prosecuted the suit. The Second
Circuit did not distinguish between allowance to a defendant and a plaintiff, but
reversed as a matter of trademark law. See Note, 34 ILL. L. REv. Ill (1937). The
Second Circuit, in Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 545
(2d Cir. 1956), has stated that Gold Dust had apparently been overruled sub silentio
by Admiral Corp. v. Penco, 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Philco Corp. v.
F. &: B. Mfg. Co., 86 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. III. 1949), disallowing attorney's fees to the
defendant due to lack of authorization in the Lanham Act, but wherein the court
expressly found that the conduct of the plaintiff was not "vexatious." The remainder
of the cases denying attorney's fees do so on the ground that the unsuccessful litigant's
conduct in that case was not so exceptional as to permit such awards. See, e.g., A.
Smith Bowman Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 374 (D. Del.
1962).
31. The court also relied on two Supreme Court decisions denying attorney's fees
in patent infringement actions: Teese v. Huntingdon, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 2 (1859) and
Philp v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460 (1873). It is perhaps noteworthy that Teese has
not been cited by any federal court or state appellate court in the United States on
this issue since 1901, and Philp, so far as can be determined, had never been cited on
the issue prior to the principal case.
32. 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § lll7 (1964).
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awarding counsel fees to the prevailing party.33 This concept of
"equity jurisdiction" has not been crystallized into any precise rules
of law, but it has been traditionally exercised by the federal courts
in such cases as when the plaintiff brings into court a "common
fund" for the benefit of a class of which he is a part,34 when willful
contempt of court or court processes are involved,35 or when the
unsuccessful litigant's conduct is fraudulent, vexatious, or oppressive.36 In refusing to acknowledge a court's equity power in a case
brought under the Lanham Act,37 the court in the principal case
33. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'! Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for the Court on the question of allowing counsel fees to the prevailing
party, stated that "allowance of such costs in appropriate situations is part of the
historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id. at 164.
[P)lainly the foundation for the historic practice of granting reimbursement for
the costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable costs is a part of the
original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation. Id. at 166.
This was a suit to impress a lien on a bank which had failed, and the action was
considered by the Court as a "variant" of the "common fund" cases wherein the
plaintiff sues on behalf of other members of a class and brings a "common fund"
into being. Attorney's fees had been allowed to plaintiffs in cases of this sort, not
because of conduct on the part of the defendant, but rather to compensate for expenditures and reward the plaintiff for his zeal on behalf of the class. See Note, 34
ILL. L. REv. 220 (1939). In Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S.
81, 85 (1941), a case not involving a common fund, the Court allowed recovery of
counsel fees against the RFC as a matter of "sound equity practice." See also Universal
Oil Prods. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 823
(1946) (dictum), where fraud was alleged on the court, the Court stated that this was
"precisely a situation where 'for dominating reasons of justice' a court may assess
counsel fees as part of the taxable costs," citing Sprague. 307 U.S. at 167. In a very
recent case holding that a federal tax lien is superior as against a mortgagee's lien for
attorney's fees pursuant to state statute, the Court recognized and reiterated the courts'
"inherent equitable powers" to award attorney's fees in a proper case, again citing
Sprague. United States v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 384 U.S. 323, 331 (1966). Courts
of appeals cases resting on the "inherent equity power" in awarding counsel fees,
without necessity of a common fund include: Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank 8c Trust
Co., 149 F.2d 466, 469 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 775 (1945); Guardian Trust Co.
v. Kansas City So. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 240-46 (Sth Cir. 1928), mid on other grounds, 281
U.S. 1 (1930).
34. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'! Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
35. Universal Oil Prods. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, rehearing denied, 329
U.S. 823 (1946) (dictum); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428
(1923) (imposed as a "penalty" to compensate for expenses incurred).
36. Cleveland v. Second Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 775 (1945); General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine 8c Boat Co., 226
F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
37. The court here recognized that the language of Sprague could be used to
support an award in this case, but reasoned that the trademark infringement cause
of action before it was "in substance an action in tort" and so refused to apply Sprague.
Principal case at 164. However, if resort is to be made to the traditional law-equity
dichotomy, it should also be noted that the plaintiff sought an injunction and an
accounting for profits, both of which are usually deemed to be in the province of
equity, along with a claim for damages which was not proven and which was therefore
dropped out of the case before the previous appeal. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 196 F. Supp. 401, 404 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 314 F.2d 149
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963). The Lanham Act remedies section, 60
Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1964), states that the plaintiff shall
recover "subject to the principles of equity."
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seems to adopt an overly restricted view of its own role as a source
of law.38 This role can perhaps be best justified when the question
of using a special remedy is presented, for it is in these circumstances
that a judicial body must adopt a sanction or a measure of compensation which is appropriate for the particular facts of the case at
bar. Indeed, it is in this context that equity courts, since the
days of the chancellor, have traditionally exercised wide discretion,
unless limited by legislative enactment or rule of court.39
As the court in the principal case points out, the Lanham Act
does not expressly provide for the recovery of attorney's fees either as
an element of compensatory or punitive damages or as costs. Thus,
Congressional intent has apparently not been expressed on the precise question presented, other than by omission.40 Although it is
true that Congress does "know how to provide for such a recovery,"
as is demonstrated in the somewhat analogous areas of copyrights
and patents,41 one must consider whether an admitted omission in
38. See Stone, The Common Law in the United States, in THE FUTURE OF THE
COMMON LAW 120, 123-25 (1937), pointing out that the judicial practice of strict
adherence to statutory authority can be attributed to (1) the ability of the legislature
to adapt and respond more quickly to changing conditions, (2) the notion fostered by
Blackstone and Coke that the common law is self-sufficient and perfect, and (3) the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Stone approved what he perceived as
a tendency toward more flexible construction. See also Landis, Statutes and The Source
of Law, HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS 213 (1934), referring to statutes as "an excrescence on
the body of law" and advocating freer use of the statutes as a base in creating law.
But see Witherspoon, The Essential Focus of Statutory Interpretation, 36 IND. L.J.
423, 435-36 (1961), arguing that a court must determine the "central purposes and
principles of the statute" and, once it determines them, it must remain faithful to them.
39. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 861-62 (1929).
40. The legislative history fails to reveal any conclusive Congressional intent. The
Trademark Acts of 1870, 16 Stat. 210, and 1905, 33 Stat. 724, contained no provision
regarding attorney's fees. The Senate report accompanying the Lanham Act, S. REP.
No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1947), states the purpose of that act is to consolidate
all federal trademark legislation and to meet international commitments, but does
not mention counsel fees. Two subsequent bills proposing various amendments to the
act included a provision for attorney's fees in "exceptional" cases. S. 2540, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 35 (1953); H.R. 7734, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 35 (1955). Both passed in the
originating house and died in the other. The Senate report accompanying S. 2540,
S. REP. No. 2266, 83d Cong., 2d Scss. 9 (1954), stated the purpose of the fees provision
was to parallel the similar provision in the patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1964), which
had been added to that act subsequent to the enactment of the Lanham Act by 66 Stat.
792 (1964). In Hearings on S. 2540 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Scss. 48 (1954), the subcommittee heard testimony of the
"National Trademark Coordinating Committee" that the courts have, in exceptional
trademark cases, permitted the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney's fees.
However, S. 2429, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), labelled a "housekeeping" amendment in
S. REP. No. 1685, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960), dropped the attorney's fees proposal
along with other earlier proposed amendments. There is no indication as to the reasons
for this deletion, other than speculation that the bill was trimmed down in order to
effect prompt passage. This bill was reintroduced as H.R. 4333, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962) and was subsequently enacted into law, 76 Stat. 769 (1962). It is submitted that
this entire "history" is ambiguous and is not determinative of the Congressional intent.
See generally McCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966).
41. 17 u.s.c. § 116 (1964); 35 u.s.c. § 285 (1964).
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an act as comprehensive as the Lanham Act should operate so as
to preclude the use of equity power of the courts. When an act does
not specifically state otherwise and the legislative intent is ambiguous, it is a rule of statutory construction to interpret such legislation in accord with the pre-existing common law and practices of
the courts.42 Furthermore, since common law trademark protection
has been consistently expanded, it is submitted that neglect in mentioning an "historical" judicial practice should not put an end to the
inquiry.
The language of the Lanham Act itself, indicates that Congress
has provided rather extensive remedies and has permitted notably
wide judicial discretion.43 Stating that the entire remedy section
shall be "subject to the principles of equity," Congress provides the
plaintiff with a three-fold recovery: (I) consequential damages suffered by the plaintiff, with a provision that the court may, at its
discretion, treble the amount proved; (2) the defendant's profits,
with a provision that the court may, if these profits are inadequate
or excessive, adjust the recovery to a "just" amount "according to
the circumstances"; and (3) the plaintiff's costs, which are not defined
in the Act. 44 The express provision that the three components of the
recovery, including "costs," shall be granted "subject to the principles of equity" lends support to the view that Congress did not
intend to preempt or foreclose the court's traditional powers in this
area. On the other hand, the court in the principal case argued that
by providing these remedies Congress indicated an intent to avoid
"piling Pelion on Ossa," and therefore Congress did not provide
for attorney's fees as this would have permitted a double recovery.
It may be suggested, however, that, to the contrary, by vesting considerable discretion in the trial judge, Congress has provided for a
tailoring of the remedy to the individual facts of the case, including
"piling Pelion on Ossa" where warranted. Clearly, double recovery
is possible under the existing damages and profits provisions. It is
equally clear that the court may "provide" for attorney's fees indirectly under the guise of trebling the damages or adjusting the
profit recovery to the trademark owner above the amount of profits
specifically established. Furthermore, the explicit reference to "costs"
as an element of recovery strongly suggests that something beyond
those normally taxable costs which are a part of every suit must have
been intended, for otherwise this clause would be mere surplusage.415 Finally, the very fact of non-definition either implies that
42. See CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATirIES § 228 (1940); 3 SUTIIElU.AND,
SrAnrrES AND STATIJTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5301 (3d ed. 1943, Supp. 1966); 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 363 (1953).
43. See generally Developments in the Law-Trademarks and Unfair Competition,
68 HARV. L. REv. 814, 863-67 (1955).
44. 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1964).
45. The remedies provisions of the 1870 Act, 16 Stat. 210, and the 1905 Act, 3!! Stat.
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the courts are to supply the meaning of the language in accordance
with common law and case precedent or it indicates the establishment of a repository of judicial discretion to adopt relief to the
circumstances of the case at bar. The language or "flavor" of the
section, then, does not appear to be the sort which should be read
or interpreted as imposing limits on the discretionary power of the
court; indeed, it seems to warrant a contrary conclusion.46 Lack of
an express provision should not preclude this interpretation of the
act.
To return to the more general problem of when to except certain situations from the general rule denying attorney's fees to the
prevailing party,47 it may be helpful to consider briefly the policy
considerations which are particularly relevant to trademark cases.
It is submitted that the nature of our economic system can supply
the justification for excepting this class of cases from the general
rule. Mass demand, mass markets, mass advertising, and varieties of
goods point toward increased reliance by the consumer on trademarks and brand names as the means of identifying the product he
rationally wished to purchase. In order to allocate properly the
729, provided for the granting of an injunction, the recovery of damages and an ac•
counting for profits, but did not mention costs specifically as does the Lanham Act
§ 1117. Assuming that this change in language, which, together with the discretionary
increase in profit recovery, are virtually the only major differences in the relevant sec•
tions of the 1905 Act and the Lanham Act, is not mere surplusage and positing the
existence of the Federal Taxable Cost Bill, 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1964), which embraces
the ordinary costs "between party and party," it may be suggested that Congress
thought it was, in fact, providing for attorney's fees by the use of this language.
Congress recognized the desirability of allowing counsel fees in exceptional cases in
most, if not all, of the other federal statutes which contemplated to some degree
enforcement of the rules of the marketplace. See note 13 supra. There does not seem
to be any policy rationale as to trademarks which is not applicable to these situations.
See also Notes of Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules, FED. R. C1v. P. 54(d), 28
U.S.C.A. at 204, specifically exempting the Lanham Act from the taxable costs provi•
sions of Rule 54(d).
46. It is recognized that in trademark infringement actions, the power of the trial
judge is considerable in determining whether confusion will or will not arise between
the trademarks. There are few, if any, standards to aid the court in this determination,
leaving it to the judge to "contemplate, speculate and weigh the probabilities of de•
ception." Colburn v. Puritan Mills, Inc., 108 F.2d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 1939). See generally
3 CALI.MAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 1375-82 (2d ed. 1950).
Thus the argument may be advanced that any expansion of standard-less discretion,
as is suggested by the text, is not to be favored. Mindful of the danger of having con•
troversies decided by men and not by law, it may be pointed out that the granting of
attorney's fees is not really an "expansion" of judicial discretion, but rather is within
the traditional equity function of courts. See text accompanying note 33 supra. Moreover, this discretion as to an awarding of attorney's fees does not go to the ultimate
question being litigated, but rather goes to the remedy to be applied after the court
has determined whether there has been an infringement. In any event, weighing
the dangers of judicial discretion against the arguments in favor of its exercise here,
such as rightful compensation and policing, see text accompanying notes 9 supra 8:
48 infra, it would appear the balance lies in the permitting of such discretion.
47. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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economic resources in the competitive marketplace, consumer
choice must not be confused or thwarted. Trademark infringement
however, can confuse the consumer, and in today's market, as a
result of large-scale confusion, the infringer may, by design, be able
to extract quickly a substantial profit and to affect a congruent
misallocation of resources. The trademark owner who protects his
own industrial property right also protects, polices, and renders
more effective the operation of our competitive markets. Effective
enforcement lies in the hands of the injured trademark owner, and
he must, therefore, be encouraged, or at least not discouraged, from
enforcing his rights.48 It is perhaps not a coincidence that in other
causes of action which are provided so as to aid in the policing of
the marketplace, attorney's fees are allowed. 49 While the Lanham
Act does provide for substantial recoveries to the owner by way of
treble damages and the recovery of profits at the court's discretion,
attorney's fees in this specialized area of the law may be and often are
a significant factor. Just as the court has discretion to adjust the recovery in an egregious case as to damages and profits, so ought this
discretion apply as to "costs between solicitor and client." 50
48. It is apparent that the force of this line of argument goes to the justification
of recovery to the successful plaintiff and does not support recovery to a successful
defendant. The notion that full compensation to an injured party should be the
underlying basis of allowance of counsel fee, see text accompanying note 9 supra, however, applies equally well to plaintiff or defendant, and thus suggests that the principles
of mutuality might be used to argue for awards to successful defendants. In the trademark area, the courts have generally confined awards to plaintiffs, suggesting that, in
this area, the argument discussed in the text predominates and thus the mutuality
principle has been seemingly iguored. In fact, those cases which denied recovery in
trademark infringement actions as a matter of law involved defendants seeking recovery. See note 30 supra. But see General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine &: Boat
Co., 226 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mich. 1964) where attorneys' fees were awarded to the
defendant because of the "oppressive tactics" used by the plaintiff in the prosecution
of his action.
49. See note 13 supra.
50. See 4 CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 1903 (2d ed.
1950); Nims, DAMAGES AND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE IN UNFAIR COMPETITION CAsES, 31
CORNELL L.Q. 431, 448 (1946).

